A Novel Approach for Security Situational Awareness in the Internet of
  Things by He, Fannv et al.
A Novel Approach for Security Situational
Awareness in the Internet of Things
Fannv He
National Computer Network
Intrusion Protection Center
University of Chinese Academy of
Sciences
Beijing, China 10000
hefn@nipc.org.cn
Yuqing Zhang
National Computer Network
Intrusion Protection Center
University of Chinese Academy of
Sciences
Beijing, China 10000
zhangyq@nipc.org.cn
Huizheng Liu
National Computer Network
Intrusion Protection Center
University of Chinese Academy of
Sciences
Beijing, China 10000
liuhz@nipc.org.cn
ABSTRACT
Internet of ings (IoT) is characterized by various of het-
erogeneous devices and facing numerous threats. Modeling
security of IoT is still a certain challenge. is paper denes
a Stochastic Colored Petri Net (SCPN) for IoT-based smart
environment and then proposes a Markov Game model for
security situational awareness (SSA) in the dened SCPN.
All possible aack paths are computed by the SCPN, and
antagonistic behavior of both aackers and defenders are
taken into consideration dynamically according to Game
eory. Two aack scenarios in smart home environment
are taken into consideration to demonstrate the eective-
ness of the proposed model. e proposed model can form a
macroscopic trend curve of security situation. Analysis of
the results shows the capabilities of the proposed model in
nding vulnerable devices and potential aack paths, and
even mitigating the impact of aacks. To our knowledge,
this is the rst aempt to establish a dynamic SSA model for
a complex IoT-based smart environment.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Internet of ings (IoT) denes a communication network
that consist of highly interconnected heterogeneous devices
[1]. IoT comes from the expansion of the Internet, which is
destined to inherit most the security issues of the Internet.
At the same time, new security issues occur to the IoT due
to the numerous devices act as sensors [2]. IoT is still in
the stage of development with no uniform standards for
the hardware, soware and communication protocols [3].
A variety of smart scenarios is also heterogeneous, which
makes the defense of IoT extremely complicated. In order to
perform amore eective and active defense as well as making
defense decisions quickly when aacks happen, we are in
expectation of real-time SSA of IoT-based environment.
Compared with the traditional SSA in the Internet, model-
ing SSA in IoT confronts the following challenges: (1) e
SSA models in the Internet rely on the static network topol-
ogy. However, the devices in IoT are ambulatory, which tend
to a dynamic topology. (2) A SSA model in the Internet al-
ways has a unied communication protocol while various
communication protocols exist in IoT system simultaneously
and the devices communicate with others through their own
protocols. (3) e SSA models in the Internet fail to consider
the susceptibility of devices such as baery power consump-
tion, while in IoT system the susceptibility should be stressed
because some passive aacks caused by low power consump-
tion oen occur such as automatic sleep.
Due to the challenges mentioned above, using the existing
cyber security models [4] to achieve the purpose of real-time
SSA in IoT is impossible. Several papers focus on develop-
ing security model for the IoT. Some of these papers [5-7]
consider the vulnerabilities existence in IoT devices and pro-
pose a framework based on the network topology, but ignore
the interaction between aackers and defenders caused by
the oensive and defensive strategies changes in the pro-
cess. Others [8,9] construct game-based security models for
the IoT. However, their scope always address on some re-
lated issues in specic elds such as power consumption and
consumer choice. Previous researches do not form a global,
systematic and complete model for SSA, but instead mainly
considers the security of IoT from certain domains.
is paper denes a SCPN for IoT-based smart environ-
ment by extending the basic Petri Net. en proposes a
Markov Game model for SSA in the dened SCPN. Smart
home environment is used to test the proposed model and
two aack scenarios in the smart home are taken into con-
sideration. e proposed model can simulate the curve of
overall security situation. From the comparison of the curves
under the two aack scenarios, we can nd vulnerable de-
vices and the potential aack paths related to them and
mitigate the impact of aacks through modifying defense
strategy.
e contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
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Figure 1: A typical Stochastic Colored Petri Net, which
comprises of places (circles), transitions (rectangles),
directed connections and colored tokens (dots).
- We dene a SCPN for IoT-based smart environment
where colored tokens represent dierent types of threats.
reats propagation between IoT devices are captured by
transitions, making the aack scenarios beer exhibited, es-
pecially for collaborative aacks caused by various threats.
- We considered the interaction of strategy changes be-
tween the aackers and defenders in the aack-defense pro-
cess, which makes the proposed model more applicable to
the real smart environment.
- To the best of our knowledge, this is the rst aempt to
use Markov Game eory in IoT-based SCPN to establish a
SSA model for a complex smart environment.
e rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
introduces methodology to develop the model. Section 3 de-
scribes a smart home environment with two aack scenarios
in detail, provides experimental results and evaluates the
performance of our model. Section 4 discusses some relevant
issues of our approach. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 METHODOLOGY
is section provides a methodological and theoretical
basis for the concepts used in the paper.
2.1 Stochastic Colored Petri Nets
Stochastic Petri Nets (SPN) is suitable for modeling the
dynamic behavior of any complex system [10]. CPN has
colored tokens, which can describe various types of data and
operations [11]. In IoT-based smart environment, aackers
usually use synergistic aacks to achieve aack goals, which
makes various threats propagate in the IoT. In this paper, we
add colored tokens (represent dierent threats) to the SPN
to expand it to a SCPN. Figure 1 shows a typical SCPN.
SCPN is dened as 6-tuple:
SCPN = (A,T , P ,C,=,TR)
e components of SCPN are:
-Assets (A) are valuable resources in the smart environ-
ment, such as IoT devices and routers. Several vulnerabilities
may be in these assets.
-Colored Tokens (T ) represent dierent types of threats.
ere may be multiple tokens in one place. More tokens
indicate that the corresponding node has been subjected to
a more serious aack, and the node is more likely to aect
other nodes. T ∗ denotes one of the threats in the smart
environment.
-Places (P ) are all the possible locations of IoT nodes in
the net. IoT nodes aected by a threat T ∗ include nodes
that have been aacked or may be aacked, expressed as
NodeT ∗ =
(
P1T ∗ , ..., P
i
T ∗
)
.
-Directed Connections (C) are located between places and
transitions, indicating the directions of threat propagation.
e propagation path of a threatT ∗ is expressed as PathT ∗ =(
C1T ∗ , ...,C
j
T ∗
)
.
-reat subnet (=) contains all the aected nodes and
propagation paths associated with these nodes. e threat
subnet of T ∗ is expressed as =T ∗ = (NodeT ∗ , PathT ∗ ).
-Transitions (TR) indicate the propagation of threats. When
a transition occurs, the token moves from a node to another.
TRξ denotes the probability of threats propagating between
two nodes successfully.
2.2 Markov Game Model
Game eory (GT) captures the nature of conicts: deter-
mination of the aacking-force strategies is tightly coupled
to determination of the defense-force strategies [13]. Markov
Decision Process (MDP) refers to the process that a decision-
maker selects the behavior from the available behavior set
based on the present state at each moment [14,15]. Markov
Game is a combination of GT and MDP. e state at the next
moment is only relevant to the current moment, so the threat
transition has Markov properties. We establish a Markov
Game model in the dened SCPN.
e proposed model is dened as 5-tuple:
MGM = (λ, S,Ω,Φ,<)
e components of the model are:
- Players (λ) set contains an aacker and a defender in
this game. e aacker (λA) spreads T ∗ for damaging the
performance of the system and the defender (λD ) cuts o the
propagation paths of T ∗ to keep the whole system stable.
- State Space (S) consists of all the possible states of =T ∗ .
e system states are determined by previous states and the
current actions. e state of the ith node at time τ is µi (τ ).
e state of the jth propagation path at time τ is η j (τ ). e
overall state of T ∗ at time τ is =T ∗ (τ ) =
{
µi (τ ) ,η j (τ )}.
- Action Space (Ω) includes all the possible combinations
of actions in the game. At every time step, each player
chooses strategies with associated actions. e aacker’s
action (Ωt ) is propagating threat with a certain probability.
e defender’s action (Ωv ) is to perform the strategy such
as xing a vulnerability, cuing o a propagation path, or
removing a IoT node.
2
-Transition Rules (Φ). e purpose of Φ is to calculate the
probability distribution over the state space (S). e variation
of the state is described by:
Φ
(=T ∗ (τ + 1) |=T ∗ (τ ) ,Ωt (τ ) ,Ωv (τ )) ,
where Ωt (τ ) denotes the action of the aacker at time τ ,
Ωv (τ ) denotes the action of the defender at time τ .
-Reward function (<). Since the purpose of the aacker
is to maximize damage of the SCPN, its reward function is
in relation to the damage. e purpose of the defender is to
minimize the damage of the SCPN, its reward function is in
relation to the reduced damage.
2.3 Game Process
Game Process involves how players make decisions under
the interaction of each other and selects strategies from Ω
according to the current state, and then get the one-step
reward.
For the aacker, T ∗ damages node i and its associated
propagation paths. e one-step reward function at time τ
is expressed as:
<tT ∗ (=T ∗ (τ )) =
∑
i ∈o
<t (µi (τ )) + ∑
j ∈pathi
<t (η j (τ )) (1)
where, i ∈ o is the nodes aected by T ∗, j ∈ pathi is the
propagation paths related to node i . <t (µi (τ )) denotes the
damage of the node i ,
∑
j ∈pathi
<t (η j (τ )) denotes the damage
of the propagation paths related to node i .
For the defender, taking security strategy will bring two
eects: reducing the damage produced by T ∗ and aect-
ing network performance inevitably. <v (µi (τ )) denotes
the variation of the node i aer taking security strategy.∑
j ∈pathi
<v (η j (τ )) denotes the variation of paths related node
i . e one-step reward function at time τ is expressed as:
<vT ∗ (=T ∗ (τ )) = −<t
(
µi (τ )) − ∑
j ∈pathi
<t (η j (τ ))
+<v (µi (τ )) + ∑
j ∈pathi
<v (η j (τ )) (2)
e threat propagates to the uninfected node through the
=T ∗ , the reward function is expressed as:
<T ∗ (=T ∗ (τ )) = <tT ∗ (=T ∗ (τ )) +<vT ∗ (=T ∗ (τ ))
+ω
∑
τ+1
Φ
(=T ∗ (τ + 1) |=T ∗ (τ ) ,Ωt (τ ) ,Ωv (τ )) · <T ∗ (=T ∗ (τ + 1))
(3)
where ω is discount factor.
2.4 Security Situational Awareness
e proposed model considers the worst situation and
evaluates the maximum damage of the system. e goal of
the defense strategy is to maximize the defender’s reward
function for the maximum damage. e reward function for
T ∗ can be expressed as:
<T ∗ (τ ) = max
Ωt ,Ωv
{<T ∗ (=T ∗ (τ ))} (4)
e security situational situation of IoT system at time τ
can be obtained by summing up the reward functions of all
the threats, which can expressed as:
<(τ ) = logB
∑
T ∈Therats
B<T ∗ (τ ) (5)
where, B is the radix.
3 EXPERIMENT AND RESULTS
e IoT has been widely applied in various elds [16-19],
including smart home, healthcare, transport, environment
monitoring, etc. We use smart home environment as a case
to test the proposed model for SSA experimentally. We di-
vide the devices into dierent regional subnets according to
the communication protocols and model the heterogeneous
subnets independently, then integrate these submodules to-
gether.
3.1 Network description
Fig. 2 shows the IoT-enabled smart home environment,
which includes a ZigBee subnet and a Wi-Fi subnet. A smart
home hub is used to support the communications of Wi-Fi,
ZigBee and Internet, which provides users a control panel
to access IoT devices and control them remotely. e smart
hub establishes a ZigBee subnet that allows home devices
(such as smart meters, thermostats, temperature) to commu-
nicate with each other by using the ZigBee wireless protocol.
Android tablet connects to both Wi-Fi network and ZigBee
network. Smart TV connects to the Wi-Fi subnet. Both tablet
and TV have access to the Internet through the smart hub.
3.2 Attack scenario
We assume the ultimate goal of an aacker is to damage
the smart lock. Because the lock is isolated, an aacker
cannot access it directly and only tries to perform inltration
aacks from other home devices. Two aack scenarios are
taken into consideration in the smart home.
Scenario 1: We take the TV as a gateway to aack the
smart home. Assuming that TV uses FFmpeg5.0. Aackers
can exploit two types of vulnerabilities [20,21] in media le
formats supported by FFmpeg5.0 to run aack code and gain
the root privilege of the TV. Table 1 shows the information
about the two vulnerabilities in the Common Vulnerabilities
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Figure 2: A smart home environment.
Table 1: Vulnerability information in the TV.
Vul CVE ID CVSS Base Score Impact
Vtv1 CVE-2008-4866 10 10
Vtv2 CVE-2009-0385 9.3 10
Table 2: Vulnerability information in the Android
Tablet.
Vul Operation Impact
Vtab1 Disrupt the conversion of Java bytecode 2
Vtab2 Modify the AndroidManifest.xml le 2
Vtab3 Obtain extended Device privileges 10
Vtab4 Automatic sleep caused by low power 5
and Exposures (CVE) and their CVSS base scores. Aer get-
ting root privileges, they can use the TV as a portal to exploit
vulnerabilities in other devices such as Android Tablet.
Scenario 2: We take Android Tablet as a portal to aack the
smart home. Assuming that aackers can write a malware to
get the root permission of Android Tablet through utilizing
three bugs [22] in the soware and operating system. Table 2
shows the information about the three vulnerabilities of the
Android Tablet. Aer geing root privileges, they use the
tablet to launch other aacks targeting the ZigBee subnet.
3.3 Experimental results and Analysis
We create an asset list for the smart home environment to
construct the SCPN, and establish the Markov Game Model
in SCPN, then evaluate the security situational of the smart
home environment under the two aack scenarios men-
tioned in section 3.2, respectively. Table 3 shows the states
Table 3: States of nodes under threat propagation at
time τ . ( for T ∗)
Asset NodeID AssetLevel rOR VulOR
Smart hub N1 5 0 1
TV N2 4 1 1
Tablet N3 5 1 1
Meter N4 3 0 0
emostat N5 2 0 1
Lock N6 5 0 1
Table 4: States of nodes under threat propagation at
time τ . ( for T ∗)
SouNodeID TarNodeID PathVlue Exploitability
N2 N1 5 3
N2 N3 5 4
N3 N5 3 1
N3 N6 1 1
of nodes at time τ for T ∗. AssLevel denotes the importance
of a asset in the SCPN and have 5 levels. rOR denotes
whether the node is infected by T ∗. VulOR denotes whether
a vulnerability exists in the node that can be exploited byT ∗.
Specically, (N3, 5, 1, 1) denotes that the Tablet’s value level
is very high and vulnerabilities exist in the Tablet and can
be exploited by T ∗.
Table 4 shows the state of propagation paths at time τ
for T ∗. PathLevel denotes the importance of a path in the
SCPN and also have 5 levels. Exploitability denotes the prob-
ability of a threat transmission through the path. Specif-
ically, (N2,N1, 5, 3) denotes that the propagation path be-
tween smart hub and Tablet is very important and utiliz-
ability of the path is medium. Fig.3 shows the parts of con-
structed SCPN in the smart environment for T ∗.
In order to facilitate the analysis of security situational
value, we normalize the security situational values according
to the min-max standardization. e results generated by
the proposed model in the two aack scenarios are shown in
Fig.4. e curves reveal the security situation trend overall,
which provide a macro perspective of security situation in
the smart home environment.
Furthermore, according to the comparison in Fig.4, we can
nd that aacking the TV has faster aack eect but lower
impact than aacking the tablet. us, the aacker is more
likely to choose the TV as the entry point. e defender
should protect the TV at rst in order to prevent the aacker
from breaking into the network. Moreover, they can take
TV as an origin and nd the potential aack paths from the
4
Figure 3: Parts of constructed SCPN in the smart envi-
ronment. ( for T ∗)
Figure 4: Security situational curves of two scenarios.
SCPN, then decide which IoT devices included in the paths
should be protected at the same time.
4 DISCUSSION
In this section, we clarify some relevant issues of our
approach and discuss the limitation of this approach.
In this paper, we establish a SSA model in a complex IoT-
based smart environment. e proposed model can form
a macroscopic trend curve of security situation and help
administrators make eective defense decisions to mitigate
the impact of potential aacks.
Compared with the previous models, (1) We chose SCPN
to describe the IoT, because SCPN will be created dynami-
cally which will make IoT-based smart environments highly
interoperable and scalable, and provide IoT system a dynam-
ical topology. (2) We divide the IoT devices into dierent
regional subnets according to the communication protocols
and model the heterogeneous subnets independently, then
integrate these submodules together thus solving the prob-
lem about heterogeneity of IoT devices. (3) We stress the
susceptibility of devices in this approach, for example, pas-
sive aacks caused by low power consumption are taken
into consideration.
It is worth mentioning that although we validate the pro-
posed model via two aack scenarios in the smart home
environment, our approach is portable that applies to other
IoT environments through modifying the parameters of the
model.
On the other hand, our approach considers the behaviors
of both player and the dual eects of propagation nodes
and propagation paths in the aack-defense process, so the
state space would be large when players making decisions.
Especially in complex IoT environment with numerous IoT
nodes and propagation paths, the resources consume is huge.
Hence, wewill focus on reducing resources consume through
combining the IoT vision with cloud computing.
5 CONCLUSION
Internet ofings (IoT) is enabling innovative applications
in various domains. Due to its heterogeneous and wide-scale
structure, it brings many new security issues. In this paper,
a SCPN is constructed for a IoT-based smart home environ-
ment, and a Markov Game model is proposed for SSA in the
dened SCPN. All possible aack paths are computed by
the SCPN, and antagonistic behavior of both aackers and
defenders are dynamically taken into consideration accord-
ing to Markov Game eory. We evaluated the proposed
model in two aack scenarios in a smart home environment.
e proposed model can form a macroscopic trend curve of
security situation. According to the analysis of the results,
we can nd the vulnerable devices and the potential aack
paths related to them in the SCPN, and then choose eective
strategies to protect the devices and mitigate the impact of
potential aacks.
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